Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a phishing as a service (PhaaS) platform designed to help remove Apple Activation Lock from stolen devices by using artificial intelligence powered voice agents. The platform, tracked by SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) as AnonyMousKIT, targets owners of recently lost or stolen Apple devices by impersonating Apple Support representatives and attempting to collect sensitive information, including device passcodes, Apple ID credentials, and live two factor authentication (2FA) codes. Apple guidance states that the company never asks users to provide passwords, device passcodes, or 2FA codes while offering support services.
According to SOCRadar, AnonyMousKIT operates as a credit based service that provides multiple communication options from a single victim record. The platform allows customers to launch phishing attempts through email, SMS, WhatsApp, recorded voice calls, and AI voice agent calls. Email messages cost 1.50 credits, SMS campaigns are priced according to sender ID usage, recorded voice calls cost one credit, and AI voice agents require two credits. Researchers described the platform as a software service with features including credit bundles, subscription tiers, customer support, status tracking, and infrastructure replacement procedures. The service uses information collected from stolen devices, including Apple model identifiers and live Find My status details, to make phishing attempts appear more authentic. Victims who follow the provided links are directed to Apple branded pages displaying an animated map of the device location before being asked to provide account information.
The AI voice channel was identified as one of the major features of the platform after researchers recovered 200 call records, 55 transcripts, and five configured personas linked to the operator account on commercial voice platform Vapi. All five personas used the same translated identity, Alice from Apple Support, across English, Spanish, and Portuguese languages. The calls took place between August 31, 2025, and May 30, 2026, with 179 of the 200 calls targeting phone numbers in Brazil. In recovered transcripts, the AI agent attempted to confirm device ownership before requesting the four or six digit passcode and repeating the numbers back to the victim for confirmation. The agent then claimed that someone had visited an Apple Store to remove the Activation Lock and asked whether the victim had received a recovery link through SMS. SOCRadar estimated that the total cost of the 200 calls was $19.24, averaging around 9.6 cents per call. The outcome records showed that 100 victims ended the calls, 48 resulted in silence timeouts, 24 received no response, and 28 failed due to platform errors or busy signals. The report did not confirm whether any passcodes, Apple IDs, or 2FA codes were successfully collected through these campaigns.
The investigation also revealed infrastructure details connected to the platform. SOCRadar accessed logs through two exposed relative file paths in the shared codebase that resolved to the web root and allowed unauthenticated HTTP access. Researchers stated that every deployment using the same codebase inherited the issue. A scan of 506 kit family domains identified 30 separate installations available across 42 domains, while 188 domains remained active. The AnonyMousKIT installation recorded 691 sending attempts between March and July 2026, compared with 6,092 attempts across the 30 backend systems. Email campaigns were among the most used methods, with common subject lines including “Your device has been found” and “Alert.” Sender names were designed to resemble Apple, Find My, Apple Support, and Apple Assistance. Researchers found that 627 of the logged email sends were delivered through a single free Gmail account, while many messages included location references for cities such as Johannesburg, Abuja, Buenos Aires, Maputo, and Mumbai. South Africa accounted for 1,735 of the wider ecosystem messages, while 64 AnonyMousKIT messages reached non consumer domains, including 27 South African government addresses. SOCRadar said those recipients appeared to have been selected because their devices were stolen rather than due to their professional roles.
The report further noted that the unlocking tools promoted through the platform mainly served as bait, as 92.7% of the targeted devices used A12 silicon or newer. Researchers explained that the checkm8 bootrom exploit only affects A5 through A11 chips and does not remove device passcodes or Activation Lock protections on newer devices. SOCRadar identified the automated AI driven voice capability as the main feature introduced by AnonyMousKIT, highlighting how artificial intelligence is being integrated into social engineering campaigns. Previous research has also identified subscription based voice phishing services that use commercial text to speech technology. Apple continues to advise users not to share passwords, device passcodes, or authentication codes through calls or websites claiming to provide support. Researchers recommended that users with high value Apple accounts use physical hardware security keys to reduce risks associated with real time 2FA interception. SOCRadar said it continues to monitor AnonyMousKIT, related storefronts, and the wider shared codebase ecosystem for further developments.
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